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To the Editor 
In response to Barton, Stossel and Stell's critique of conflicts of interest 
Over the past two decades, a deep suspicion has emerged in the healthcare community about the 
influence of private industry – particularly the pharmaceutical industry – over doctors, researchers, 
regulators and policymakers [1, 2]. In response to the perceived threats posed by conflicts of interest 
(COI), there have been calls for a range of measures including stricter disclosure statements, more 
transparency, and tighter regulation of medical and industry interactions [3]. 
Not surprisingly, such demands tend to be resisted by the pharmaceutical industry, and by a subset 
of clinicians and researchers who believe that claims of adverse industry influence are overblown 
[4]. One such example is the recent article by Barton, Stossel and Stell in the International Journal of 
Clinical Practice [5]. 
Barton et al. argue that concerns about COI are exaggerated and unsupported by empirical evidence, 
and that demands for regulation and transparency distract medical professionals, researchers and 
policymakers from their primary task – improving patient outcomes. Furthermore, they suggest that 
if there is no evidence that patient outcomes are negatively affected by COI, then there is no cause 
for concern. They claim that the ‘conflict of interest movement has failed to substantiate its central 
claim that interactions between physicians, researchers and the medical products industry cause 
physicians to make clinical decisions that are adverse to the best interests of their patients.’ The 
medical community and bioethicists in particular, should therefore stop worrying about COI. 
This is not a new argument. Indeed, the authors have been making this case for almost a decade [6], 
and others have made similar claims [7]. Despite the persistence of such arguments, there are two 
reasons to think that Barton and colleagues are mistaken: the first is that there are, in fact, reports 
that demonstrate that interactions with industry do in fact impede rational prescribing and may, 
therefore, harm patients [8-11]. The second and less obvious reason has to do with the way Barton 
et al. have defined conflict of interest. 
2 | P a g e  
 
According to Barton et al., the only grounds for concern about COI is negative patient outcomes – 
which, they suggest are ‘the only outcomes that really matter’ [5]. We suggest that this definition is 
inappropriately narrow and that by defining COI in this way, Barton et al. manipulate the debate and 
construct what is known as a ‘persuasive definition’ of COI. Coined by philosopher Charles 
Stevenson, a persuasive definition is a rhetorical tactic that purports to outline the standard 
meaning of a term, yet actually offers an idiosyncratic definition that redirects people's attitudes 
towards particular ends ([12], p. 210ff). Thus, while Barton et al. claim that their definition of COI 
reflects the concerns of those in the ‘COI movement’ it actually excludes much, and directs attention 
only towards the narrow issue of patient outcomes. 
This strategy becomes clear when one considers how Dennis Thompson, the explicit target of Barton 
et al., defined COI as ‘a set of conditions in which professional judgment concerning a primary 
interest (such as a patient's welfare or the validity of research) tends to be unduly influenced by a 
secondary interest (such as financial gain)’ ([13], p. 573). Thompson's definition is concerned with 
patient outcomes, but not exclusively so. 
Thompson's definition reflects the reality that determining the interests of medical professionals is 
not straightforward [14, 15]. Medical professionals, especially those working in teaching and 
research hospitals, have many interests and roles. To suggest that medical professionals are 
exclusively occupied with the interests of patients is an idealized caricature. The plurality of roles 
and interests implies two things. First, there will be competition and conflict among interests (not 
necessarily bad). Second, patient outcomes are not the only area that can be negatively affected by 
COI [9, 16-21]. 
The so-called ‘COI movement’ uses a definition of COI similar to Thompson's. But rather than 
addressing the arguments and definitions of those they are criticising, Barton et al.'s use of a 
persuasive definition narrows the scope of COI such that the diverse concerns about COI can be 
dismissed as ‘ideological’ [5]. 
Barton and colleagues are, however, right to suggest that critical questions need to be asked about 
the significance of COI. But this will require more research about the meaning and impact of COI in 
medicine, not less. 
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